Authored Books

 

- Coercion and the Nature of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2020);

- Morality and the Nature of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019);

- Derecho y Moral: El Debate entre el Positivismo Incluyente y el Excluyente (Law and Morality: The Inclusive/Exclusive Debate in Legal Positivism), (translated into Spanish by Jorge Fabra, Mattan Shrager and Carolina Guzmán), Serie de Teoria del Derecho (Bogota: Universidad Externado de Columbia, 2011).

 

Edited Books

 

- Law as an Artifact, Editor (with Luka Burazin and Corrado Roversi), (New york: Oxford University Press, 2018);

- Courts, Interpretation, and the Rule of Law, Editor (with Miodrag Jovanović), (The Hague: Eleven International Publishing, 2013);

- The Nature of Law: Problems in Conceptual Jurisprudence, Editor (Foundation Press, 2011);

- The Rule of Recognition and the U.S. Constitution, Co-Editor (with Matthew Adler) (Oxford UP, 2010);

- The Handbook of Information and Computer Ethics, Co-Editor (with Herman Tavani) (Wiley, 2009);

- Readings in Internet Security: Hacking, Counterhacking, and Society (Boston, MA: Jones and Bartlett Publishers, 2006);

- Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy, Associate Editor (with Jules Coleman and Scott Shapiro, Eds.) (Oxford UP, 2001).

 

Articles (Legal Theory and Philosophy of Law)

 

- "Conceptual Jurisprudence: An Introduction to Conceptual Analysis and Methodology in Legal Theory," Revus - journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law, 26 (2015);

- "The Logic of Showing Possibility Claims: A Positive Argument for Inclusive Legal Positivism and Moral Grounds of Law," Revus - journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law, 23 (2014);

- “What Exactly is the Problem with Judicial Supremacy? The Rule of Law, Moral Legitimacy, and the Construction of Constitutional Law,” in Himma and Jovanović (eds.), Courts, Interpretation, and the Rule of Law (The Hague: Eleven International Publishing, 2013);

- “A Comprehensive Hartian Theory of Legal Obligation: Social Pressure, Coercive Enforcement, and the Legal Obligations of Citizens,” in Wilfrid Waluchow and Stefan Sciaraffa (eds.) The Nature of Law: Contemporary Perspectives (Oxford UP, 2013);

- “Understanding the Content of the Rule of Recognition in the United States” in Matthew Adler and Kenneth Einar Himma (eds.), The Rule of Recognition and the U.S. Constitution, (Oxford UP, 2010);

- “Reconsidering a Dogma“Reconsidering a Dogma: Conceptual Analysis, the Naturalistic Turn, and Legal Philosophy,” in Ross Harrison (ed.), Law and Philosophy: Current Legal Philosophy (Oxford UP, 2008);

- “Inclusive Legal Positivism,” in Jules L. Coleman and Scott Shapiro (eds.), Kenneth Himma, (assoc. ed.), Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002);

- “Law’s Claim of Legitimate Authority,” in Jules L. Coleman (ed.), Hart’s Postscript: Essays on the Postscript to the Concept of Law (Oxford UP, 2001);

- “The Ties that Bind: An Analysis of the Concept of Obligation,” forthcoming in Ratio Juris: An International Journal of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law, 2012;

- “Toward a Lockean Justification of Legal Protection of Intellectual Property,” forthcoming in University of San Diego Law Review (2012);

- “Positivism and the Moral Semantics Thesis: Does Law Call for a Moral Semantics?” Ratio Juris: An International Journal of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law, vol. 22, no. 1 (March 2009);

- “Revisiting Raz: Inclusive Positivism and the Razian Conception of Authority,” APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Law, vol. 6, no. 2 (Spring 2007);

- “Privacy vs. Security: Why Privacy is Not an Absolute Value or Rights,” University of San Diego Law Review (Fourth Annual Editors’ Symposium), vol. 45 (2007);

- “Just Because You’re Smarter than Me Doesn’t Give You the Right to Tell Me What to Do: Legitimate Authority and the Normal Justification Thesis,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 27, no. 1 (2007);

- “Final Authority to Bind with Moral Mistakes: On the Explanatory Potential of Inclusive Legal Positivism,” Law and Philosophy, vol. 24, no. 1 (January 2005);

- Towards a Theory of Legitimate Access: Morally Legitimate Authority and the Right of Citizens to Access the Civil Justice System,” Washington Law Review (Technology, Justice, and Values Symposium and Conference Edition), vol. 79, no. 1 (February 2004), 31-76;

- “Making Sense of Constitutional Disagreement: Legal Positivism, the Bill of Rights, and the Conventional Rule of Recognition in the United States,” Journal of Law in Society, vol. 4, no. 2 (Winter 2003);

- “Substance and Method in Conceptual Jurisprudence and Legal Theory,” Virginia Law Review, vol. 88, no. 5 (September 2002);

- “Trouble in Law’s Empire: Rethinking Dworkin’s Third Theory of Law,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 23, no. 3 (Fall 2003);

- “Ambiguously Stung: Dworkin’s Semantic Sting Reconfigured,” Legal Theory, vol. 8, no. 2 (June 2002);

- “Situating Dworkin: The Logical Space Between Legal Positivism and Natural Law Theory,” Oklahoma City University Law Review, vol. 27, no. 1 (Spring 2002);

- “The Instantiation Thesis and Raz’s Critique of Inclusive Positivism,” Law and Philosophy, vol. 20, no. 1 (January 2001);

- “Bringing Hart and Raz to the Table: Coleman’s Compatibility Thesis,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 21, no. 4 (Winter 2001);

- “H.L.A. Hart and the Practical Difference Thesis,” Legal Theory, vol. 6, no. 1 (March 2000);

- “Incorporationism and the Objectivity of Moral Norms,” Legal Theory, vol. 5, no. 4 (December 1999);

- “Judicial Discretion and the Concept of Law,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 19, no. 1 (Spring 1999);

- “Waluchow’s Defense of Inclusive Positivism,” Legal Theory, vol. 5, no. 1 (March 1999);

- “The Epistemic Sense of the Pedigree Thesis,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 80, no. 1 (1999);

- “Positivism, Naturalism, and the Obligation to Obey Law,” Southern Journal of Philosophy, vol. 36, no. 2 (Summer 1998).

 

 

Articles (Information and Computer Ethics)

 

- “The Legitimacy of Protecting Intellectual Property Rights: The Irrelevance of Two Conceptions of an Information Commons” forthcoming in Journal of Information, Communications, and Ethics in Society (forthcoming, 2013)

- “Ethics and Information Security: Hacking, Counterhacking, and Hacktivism,” in Himma and Tavani (ed.), Handbook of Information and Computer Ethics (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley Publishing Co., 2008);

- “Digital Divide,” (with Maria Bottis) Himma and Tavani (ed.), Handbook of Information and Computer Ethics (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley Publishing Co., 2008);

- “Hacking as Politically Motivated Civil Disobedience: Is Hacktivism Morally Justified?” Kenneth Einar Himma (ed.), Readings in Internet Security: Hacking, Counterhacking, and Society (Boston, MA: Jones and Bartlett Publishers, 2006);

- “Artificial Agency, Consciousness, and the Criteria for Moral Agency: What Properties Must an Artificial Agent Have to be a Moral Agent?" Ethics and Information Technology, vol. 11, no. 1 (March 2009);

- “Justifying Intellectual Property: the Interests Argument,” Computers and Society, vol. 8, no. 4 (December 2008);

- “The Justification of Intellectual Property Rights: Contemporary Philosophical Disputes” (Perspectives on Global Information Ethics) Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology, vol. 59 no. 7 (May 2008);

- “The Intercultural Ethics Agenda from the Point of View of a Moral Objectivist,” Journal of Information, Ethics, and Communication in Society, vol. 6, no. 2 (2008);

- “Information Poverty in the Developing World and the Obligation to Help the Impoverished,” International Review of Information Ethics; http://www.i-r-i-e.net/index.htm;

- “The Concept of Information Overload: A Preliminary Step in Understanding the Nature of a Harmful Information-Related Condition,” Ethics and Information Technology, vol. 9, no. 4 (December 2007);

- “Information and Intellectual Property Protection: Evaluating the Claim that Information Should be Free,” APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Law, vol. 4, no. 2 (Spring 2005);

- “There’s Something about Mary: The Moral Value of Things qua Information Objects,” Ethics and Information Technology, vol. 6, no.3 (September 2004);

- “The Moral Significance of the Interest in Information: Reflections on a Fundamental Right to Information,” Journal of Information, Communication, and Ethics in Society, vol. 2, no. 4 (2004);

- “Targeting the Innocent: Active Defense and the Moral Immunity of Innocent Persons from Aggression,” Journal of Information, Communication, and Ethics in Society, vol. 2, no. 1 (January 2004);

- “The Relationship between the Uniqueness of Computer Ethics and Its Independence as a Discipline in Applied Ethics,” Ethics and Information Technology, vol. 5, no. 4 (2004) (Special Issue: Computer Ethics in a Post-9/11 World).

 

 

Articles (Philosophy of Religion)

 

- “Punishment for those Who Accept Jesus and Repent? The Problem of Unresolved Wrongdoing,” Faith and Philosophy, vol. 27, no. 4 (2010);

- “Plantinga’s Version of the Free Will Argument: The Good and Evil that Free Beings Do,” Religious Studies, vol. 46, no. 1, (March 2010);

- “The Free Will Defense: Evil and the Moral Value of Free Will,” Religious Studies, vol. 45, no. 4 (December 2009);

- “The Application-Conditions for Design Inferences: Why the Design Arguments Need the Help of Other Arguments for God’s Existence,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, vol. 57, no. 1 (February 2005);

- “Christian Faith without Belief that God Exists: A Defense of Pojman’s Conception of Faith,” Faith and Philosophy, vol. 23, no.1 (January 2006);

- “Harm, Sharm, and One Extremely Creepy Argument: A Reply to Mark C. Murphy,” forthcoming in Faith and Philosophy, vol. 21, no. 2 (April 2004);

- “Finding a High Road: The Moral Case for Salvific Pluralism,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, vol. 52, no. 1 (August 2002);

- “Eternally Incorrigible: The Continuing Sin Response to the Proportionality Problem of Hell,” Religious Studies, vol. 39, no. 1 (2003);

- “Prior Probabilities and Confirmation Theory: A Problem with the Fine-Tuning Argument,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, vol. 51, no. 4 (June 2002);

- “No Harm, No Foul: Abortion and the Implications of Fetal Innocence,” Faith and Philosophy, vol. 19, no.2 (April 2002); 172-194