Je li, doista, uvijek i svuda, sve što nije zabranjeno dopušteno? Pokušaj jedne teorijskopravne kozerije

https://doi.org/10.3935/zpfz.69.56.03

Dr. sc. Zoran Pokrovac, profesor Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Splitu, Domovinskoga rata 8, Split; pokrovac@pravst.hr; ORCID ID: orcid.org/ 0000-0002-1341-8372

Sažetak
I nepravnici i pravnici rado “potežu” argument da je sve što nije zabranjeno dopušteno. Vrhovni sud RH to “pravilo” uzdiže u rang osnovnih načela. Brojni su primjeri naivnog i olakog argumentiranja, i među pravnicima i među nepravnicima, da je sve što nije zabranjeno dopušteno.
Već je Aristotel upozoravao na moguću kontradiktornu suprotnost zapovijedi i zabrane, a povijest njihova pojmovnog odnosa duga je i komplicirana.
S obzirom na slobodu ili bezbroj mogućnosti podijeljenog ponašanja proizlazi da “sve one bezbrojne mogućnosti koje nisu normativno zabranjene jesu pravno dopuštene nužnošću same egzistencije” (Visković). Upravo to je “aksiom slobode, koji dominira pravnim sistemom” i koji nije “logičke, već ontološke, egzistencijalne prirode” (ibid.). Dokazivao sam da samo u modernim pravnim sistemima svako konkretno djelovanje oko čije (ne)dopuštenosti postoji spor može postati predmet sudskog odlučivanja i da su upravo sudovi – u pravilu – dužni odnosno slobodni donijeti konačnu odluku o sporu. Prije konačne sudske odluke svako je konkretno djelovanje i potencijalno dopušteno i potencijalno nedopušteno, odnosno vlada neizvjesnost glede njegove (ne)dopuštenosti. Princip da sve što nije zabranjeno jest dopušteno realistički preformuliran glasio bi: svako konkretno djelovanje koje nije bilo predmet sudske kontrole može biti sudski kontrolirano i može biti zabranjeno ili dopušteno; svako konkretno djelovanje koje je bilo predmet sudske kontrole, a nije zabranjeno, jest dopušteno. Ni tako preformuliran princip nije povijesno univerzalan.

Ključne riječi: načelo sve što nije zabranjeno je dopušteno; neizvjesnost; sudska kontrola; subjektivno pravo

Hrčak ID: 233800

URI: https://hrcak.srce.hr/233800

Stranice: 663-680

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Is All That Is Not Prohibited Really Always and Everywhere Permitted? An Attempt at a Legal-Theoretical Causerie

https://doi.org/10.3935/zpfz.69.56.03

Zoran Pokrovac, Ph. D., Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Split, Domovinskoga rata 8, Split; pokrovac@pravst.hr; ORCID ID: orcid.org/0000-0002-1341-8372

Summary
Both laymen and lawyers often invoke the argument that everything which is not prohibited is permitted. The Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia elevates that “rule” to the rank of a basic principle: “The basic principle is that all that is not prohibited is permitted” (emphasis by Z.P.). In assessing the constitutionality of the pertinent Supreme Court judgment, the Constitutional Court concludes that: “[…] the competent courts [...] provided serious, relevant and sufficient reasons for their decisions, or that they explained their legal positions in a manner which leaves no room for doubt as to the arbitrariness of action and decision-making”. At least in this regard the legislator seems to be clear: “Any economic activity that is not prohibited by law is permitted” (Art. 2/3, Crafts Act). Laymen are not falling behind either. There are numerous examples of naive and lightly made argumentation, among both lawyers and laymen, that everything which is not prohibited is permitted.
Already Aristotle warned about the possible contradiction between order and prohibition, and the history of their conceptual relation is long and complicated.
All legal behaviour, according to Cossio, is marked by preventability and, because of its coexistentiality, either permitted or not permitted. Given the freedom or innumerable possibilities of shared behaviour, it follows that “all those innumerable possibilities which are not normatively prohibited are legally permitted by the necessity of mere existence” (Visković). This is precisely the “axiom of freedom, which dominates the legal system” and which is not of a “logical, but of an ontological, existential nature” (ib.). I have argued that only in modern legal systems any concrete action whose (non)permissibility is disputed can become the subject of adjudication and that the courts are, as a rule, obliged and free to make the final decision on the dispute. Before a final court decision, all concrete behaviour is potentially permitted and potentially not permitted, i.e. there exists uncertainty regarding its (non)permissibility. Because of the inability to legally prohibit or permit innumerable possibilities of action before judicial control, it does not follow, logically or existentially, that they are permitted or prohibited. Were we to realistically reformulate the principle that everything which is not prohibited is permitted, it would run as follows: any concrete action which has not been subject to judicial control can be judicially controlled and can be prohibited or permitted; every concrete action which has been the subject of judicial control, and was not prohibited, is permitted. However, the principle thus reformulated is not historically universal either.

Keywords: principle that all which is not prohibited is permitted; uncertainty; judicial control; subjective right

Hrčak ID: 233800

URI: https://hrcak.srce.hr/233800

Pages: 663-680