CONTRA IUS SENTENTIAM DARE. PROFILES OF NULLITY OF JUDGEMENTS IN BREACH OF SUBSTANTIVE LAW IN THE OPINIONS OF LATE CLASSICAL ROMAN JURISTS
Daniil Tuzov, Doctor of legal sciences (Doktor juridičeskih nauk), Ph. D., Professor, Faculty of Law, St. Petersburg State University, 22nd line V.o. 7, St. Petersburg, Russia; email@example.com
CONTRA IUS SENTENTIAM DARE. OBLICI NEVALJANOSTI PRESUDA PROTIVNIH PRAVU U PROMIŠLJANJIMA KASNOKLASIČNIH RIMSKIH PRAVNIKA
Dr. sc. Daniil Tuzov, profesor Pravnog fakulteta Državnog sveučilišta u St. Petersburgu, 22nd line V.o. 7, St. Petersburg, Ruska Federacija; firstname.lastname@example.org
Contrary to the general pattern of construction outlined already in the Glossa and generally shared by the modern doctrine, it is assumed that Roman jurisprudence did not shape a rule regarding sententiae contra constitutiones (or, in general, contra ius) datae. It is argued that in this matter, as in many other legal issues, the iuris prudentes identifying the nullity criteria for a judgment in breach of substantive law proceeded from particular concrete cases and avoided, as a rule, formulating abstract rules; their opinions did not always match, which brought about the development of a particular phenomenon known as ius controversum. It is concluded that the wellknown principle put forward by Macer (D. 220.127.116.11), and based on the opposition of the judgments contra ius constitutionis and contra ius litigatoris, is only one of a number of possible nullity criteria, which reflects a personal opinion of this lawyer, rather than a well-established principle generally accepted by the Roman jurisprudence. Particular attention is paid to the following sources: Mac. 2 de appell. D. 18.104.22.168; Call. 3 cogn. D. 42.1.32; Ulp. 11 ad ed. D. 22.214.171.124; Alex. C. 7.64.2; Mod. l. sing. de enucl. cas. D. 49.1.19; Mod. 1 resp. D. 42.1.27.
Keywords: Roman law, cognitio extra ordinem, Roman civil procedure, sententia contra ius, sententia contra constitutiones, nullity of judgment